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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC
SCHOOL SPEECH-AN EXPANSIVE VIEW OF A SCHOOL'S AUTHORITY TO
DISCIPLINE ALLEGEDLY THREATENING STUDENT SPEECH ARISING OFF
CAMPUS. Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 306 F.3d 616 (8th
Cir. 2002).
I. INTRODUCTION
In light of several highly publicized school shootings in recent years,
school officials across the country increasingly punish student expression
and conduct perceived to be threatening.' While this increased scrutiny is in
many respects understandable, it is often unconstitutional.2 School districts
surely have a right-even a duty-to discipline student speech that rises to
the level of a threat.3 But parsing protected speech from proscribable threats
is a tricky task-a task that continues to challenge modem courts. So when
does speech constitute a true threat? When can a school district punish a
perceived threat without trampling on a student's free speech rights? These
questions are difficult enough when a threat is made on school grounds, but
consider the quandary presented when a student makes a threat off campus.
In this situation, when does a school have the authority to discipline a stu-
dent for such off campus speech?
This note examines Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District,4 a
recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit that confronts these questions. The note begins by chronicling the
facts of Doe, including the "puppy love" romance and break-up of two jun-
ior high teenagers, the violent and threatening letter at the heart of the case,
the school's reaction, and the ensuing progression through the court system.5
Next, the note explores both the history of the true threats doctrine-from
its origin in the 1969 United States Supreme Court case, Watts v. United
States,6 to the circuit courts' subsequent attempts to define a true threat7-
and the law governing free speech in the secondary public school context.
8
Within this review of background law, the note also examines the underly-
1. Kathryn E. McIntyre, Hysteria Trumps First Amendment: Balancing Student Speech
with School Safety, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 39, 40-42 (2002). McIntyre says that
in the last two years, suspensions and expulsions have dramatically increased for student
conduct neither criminal nor violent. Id. at 42.
2. Id. at 42-43.
3. See Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 625 (2002).
4. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
5. See infra Part 11.
6. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); see infra Part III.A.1.
7. See infra Part III.A.2.
8. See infra Part III.B. 1-2.
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ing policy issue of judicial deference to local school board decisions.9 The
note then explains the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in finding that J.M.'s letter was a true threat, examining the
arguments of the majority opinion as well as the two dissenting opinions.' l
Finally, the note considers the significance of the Doe holding, proposing
that, by excluding the school context analysis, the majority erroneously
suggests to school officials a seemingly unlimited authority to discipline
student speech arising off campus.1'
II. FACTS
J.M. and K.G. 12 "dated" during the seventh grade at Northwood Junior
High School.' 3 The relationship consisted primarily of time spent together at
school and at church. 14 Sometime during the summer of 2000-following
the conclusion of the seventh-grade school year-K.G. became interested in
another boy and broke up with J.M.'
5
J.M., frustrated and angry about the break-up, wrote two drafts of a
violent, obscenity-laden "composition"' 6 expressing a desire to rape and
9. See infra Part III.B.3.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. The parties involved in this case were minors at the time of the suit. See Doe v.
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2002). The court has sealed
the record of the case in order to protect the identities of the minors. Consequently, both the
court opinions and this note refer to the parties by their initials. Id. "J.M." refers to the plain-
tiff, a male who at the time of the suit was fourteen years of age. John Doe v. Pulaski County
Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2000). "K.G." is
a female student who was thirteen years old when J.M. targeted K.G. with the alleged threats.
Doe, 306 F.3d at 625.
Additionally, because of the court-ordered seal, the author was unable to access
attorneys' briefs, trial transcripts, and other trial documents for the purposes of researching
this note.
13. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619.
14. Id. Both J.M. and K.G. attended Stanfill Baptist Church and were involved in the
church youth group. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 838
n.6 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'den banc, 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
15. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619. The couple apparently had experienced multiple break-ups
during the previous school year. Id.
16. The term "composition" was used by the district court to refer generically to the
writing in question. John Doe, No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 2. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals used both "letter" and "song" to refer to the composition throughout its opinion,
Doe ex rel. Doe, 263 F.3d at 835 n.3, because J.M. first intended the writing to be a song but
later drafted it as a letter. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619. According to J.M., he initially attempted to
write a song patterned after the lyrics of rap artists such as Eminem, Juvenile, and Kid Rock.
Id. Finding however that his "songs" fit no particular rhythm, he ultimately treated the com-
positions as letters, signing both at their respective conclusions. ld.
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murder K.G."7 In the four-page writing J.M. used the "f-word" approxi-
mately ninety times;' 8 referred to K.G. as a "bitch," "slut," "ass," and
"whore" more than eighty times;' 9 and described in coarse detail how he
planned to rape, sodomize, and murder K.G.2° J.M. also warned K.G. twice
in the letter that he planned to hide under her bed and kill her with a knife as
she slept.2'
J.M. wrote the letters at his home and allegedly had no intention of
sharing the letters' contents with anyone.22 Approximately one month prior
to the beginning of the 2000-2001 school year, J.M.'s best friend, D.M.,
found one of the letters in J.M's bedroom while searching for something on
top of a dresser.23 J.M. immediately snatched the letter from D.M.'s hands,
but after D.M. asked to read it, J.M. relented and handed it back to DM.
24
D.M. then asked for a copy of the letter, but J.M. refused the request.
25
In the days following D.M.'s discovery of the letter, K.G. also became
aware of the letter's existence.26 At some point during this time, K.G. and
J.M. engaged in two or three telephone conversations in which they dis-
cussed the letter.27 J.M. initially denied to K.G. that he wrote the letters,
claiming that another boy was the author,28 but later admitted that he had in
fact written them.29 In at least one conversation, J.M. told K.G. that the let-
ters contained statements about killing her.30 Additionally, at some point
17. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619.
18. Id. at 625.
19. Id.
20. Doe ex rel. Doe, 263 F.3d at 839 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
21. Doe, 306 F.3d at 625.
22. Id. at 619; Doe ex rel. Doe, 263 F.3d at 835.
23. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619. The parties disputed the facts concerning precisely when J.M.
wrote the letter and when D.M. discovered the letter. Id. at 628 n.6 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
J.M.'s father contended that the letter remained in J.M.'s bedroom for two months before
D.M. stole it. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The attorney for the school district stated during
oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit that he believed J.M. wrote the letter in late July or
early August. Oral Argument, Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th
Cir. 2002), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html [hereinafter
Oral Argument].
24. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court noted that it was unclear how K.G. first learned of the letter. Id. K.G.
testified that she first learned of a letter during a phone conversation with J.M., but J.M.
claimed that K.G. found out about the letter through D.M. Id.
27. Id. During oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit, attorneys for both parties noted
that there was factual dispute as to who initiated the telephone calls. Oral Argument, supra
note 23.
28. John Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 2
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2000).
29. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619.
30. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 835 (8th Cir.
2001).
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during one of the phone conversations, K.G. asked J.M. if she could read
the "songs" he had written, but J.M refused her request.
31
Approximately one week before the new school year began, D.M.
spent the night at J.M.'s house and, at the request of K.G., stole one of the
letters.32 D.M. then called K.G. and read portions of the letter to her over the
phone, at which point K.G. asked D.M. to bring her the letter.
33
D.M. delivered the letter to K.G. on the second day of the new school
year.34 K.G. read the letter in gym class in the presence of several other stu-
dents.35 One of the other students present notified the school resource offi-
cer of the letter.36 The resource officer accompanied the student back to the
gym where the officer conducted an investigation and informed school ad-
ministrators of the situation.37 After meeting with each of the students in-
volved, Principal Allison recommended that the district expel J.M. from
Northwood for the remainder of his eighth-grade year in accordance with
the school district's "terroristic threatening" policy.
38
At a conference the following day, J.M. and his parents appealed the
expulsion to Dr. Welch, director of Student Services and Athletics, who
served as a hearing officer for the district. 39 Dr. Welch recommended that
the school suspend J.M. for one semester and that he be able to attend the
district's alternative school during his suspension. 40 At some point during
31. Id. This fact-mentioned in both preceding opinions-Aoes not appear in the Eighth
Circuit's en banc opinion.
32. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619.
33. Doe ex rel. Doe, 263 F.3d at 835. Again, while the district court and the Eighth
Circuit's panel opinions mention this conversation, the Eighth Circuit's en bane opinion does
not include it.
34. Doe, 306 F.3d at 619-20.
35. Id. at 620.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. ld. Principal Allison based his recommendation on Rule 36 of the school district's
Handbook for Student Conduct and Discipline. Id. The rule provides: "Students shall not,
with the purpose of terrorizing another person, threaten to cause death or serious physical
injury or substantial property damage to another person or threaten physical injury to teach-
ers or school employees." Id. at 620 n.2. Rule 36 further provides that students violating the
rule will be recommended for expulsion. Id.
39. Id. The conference, also described as a "hearing" by the district court, appears to
have been requested by Principal Allison immediately upon J.M.'s expulsion. See John Doe
v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22,
2000). Mr. Calhoun, assistant principal at Northwood, also attended the conference. Id.
40. Doe, 306 F.3d at 620. The district's alternative school is referred to as "Alpha
Academy" and is "designed to provide prevention and intervention strategies to students
dropping out of school due to excessive suspensions, poor attendance, inappropriate behav-
ior, or lack of interest in academics." PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
HANDBOOK FOR STUDENT CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE 30 (2002-03), available at
http://www.pcssd.org/dept/account/PCSSD Sec Handbook_2002-03.pdf.
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this time, a police officer interviewed the students involved, but the state
prosecuting attorney declined to take action against J.M.
4 1
Still unhappy with the semester-long suspension, J.M. and his parents
appealed Dr. Welch's recommendation to the Pulaski County School
Board.42 On September 12, 2000, the school board voted to extend J.M.'s
expulsion to the end of the school year as well as deny him the opportunity
to attend alternative school.43
On September 26, 2000, J.M., through his parents, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging
that the school district violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 4 The following day, the court issued a temporary restraining
order, reinstating J.M. to the school district but stipulating that he have no
contact with K.G.45 Following a bench trial in November,46 the district court
held that J.M.'s letter did not constitute a true threat of violence and there-
fore was protected speech under the First Amendment.47 The court ordered
the school district to terminate the expulsion and remove all references to
the expulsion from J.M.'s school records.48 The school district appealed,
and a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.49 The Eighth Circuit then
granted the school district's request for a rehearing en banc.0 On September
25, 2002, the Eighth Circuit, in a six to four decision, reversed the district
court, finding that J.M.'s letter constituted a true threat, and, therefore, his
expulsion did not violate the First Amendment.5'
41. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir.
2001).
42. Id. at 836. The appeal was not heard until the September 12, 2000 school board
meeting. Id. Consequently, J.M. attended alternative school from August 29 to September 12.
Id.
43. Id. For a discussion of the school board proceedings on September 12, 2000, see
infra Part IV.B.4.
44. John Doe, No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 1.
45. Doe, 306 F.3d at 620.
46. John Doe, No. 4:00CV00707 GH, slip op. at 1.
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir.
2001). The Eighth Circuit's three-judge panel--consisting of Judge Hansen, Judge Heaney,
and District Judge Tunheim of the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation-affirmed
the district court in a two to one decision. Id. at 834-35.




Doe falls under the analytical umbrella of two areas of First Amend-
ment law. On one hand, the content of J.M.'s speech clearly involves the
"true threat" limitation to the Free Speech Clause. 52 But at the same time,
because it was a public school authority that disciplined J.M., the case im-
plicates speech limitations arising within the context of public schools.
53
Accordingly, this section first will trace the development of free
speech limitations-focusing primarily on the "true threat" doctrine and its
development through United States Supreme Court and federal circuit court
decisions. 54 The section then will give an overview of free speech jurispru-
dence within the context of secondary public schools-emphasizing the
distinction between on campus and off campus expression, 55 as well as ad-
dressing the underlying policy issue of judicial deference to local school
authorities.
56
A. The "True Threat" Doctrine
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."57
Under the First Amendment, the government may not proscribe what people
see, read, speak, or hear.58 But while freedom of speech is among the most
highly regarded constitutional rights, its protections are not absolute.5 9 The
Supreme Court has recognized certain narrow classes of speech-including
obscenity, defamation, "fighting words," and "true threats" 6 0-that can be
limited in certain instances without giving rise to constitutional violations.6'
The Court has reasoned that these classes of speech are limitable because
52. Id. at 621-22.
53. Id. at 627 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. See infra Part 111.3B.1-2.
56. See infra Part 111.13.3.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
58. E.g., Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (finding
several provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 unconstitutionally over-
broad).
59. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (upholding as consti-
tutional a New Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of speech in a public place that was
likely to cause a breach of the peace).
60. See R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defa-
mation); and Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting words)).
61. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. These types of speech are limitable "because of their
constitutionally proscribable content. These categories, however, are not entirely invisible to
the Constitution, and government may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism,
towards a nonproscribable message they contain." R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 377.
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they "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
62
1. The Supreme Court and True Threats
The Supreme Court has articulated the precise social interests it seeks
to protect by limiting speech that threatens violence.63 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority in R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul,64 reasoned that threats of vio-
lence fall outside the First Amendment because of our nation's interest in
"protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that
fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur." 65 With these interests in mind, the Court has recognized "true
threats" as a proscribable class of speech.66
The "true threat" doctrine finds its origin in Watts v. United States,67 a
1969 case in which a man made a threat against President Lyndon B. John-
son in violation of a federal statute.68 The Supreme Court distinguished, in a
per curiam opinion, threats from constitutionally protected speech,69 but
provided little else in defining specifically what constitutes a true threat.7°
In Watts the alleged threat occurred when the defendant, speaking to a
small group attending a Washington, D.C., rally, said, "[i]f they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,, 7I In deter-
mining whether Watts's statement was proscribable, the Court considered
62. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
63. See R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 377.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 388.
66. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam). Threats also are
proscribable under a variety of federal and state statutes. See John Rothchild, Menacing
Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement That Threatens, 8
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 212 (1999). An examination of threats punished under such stat-
utes, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
67. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 706. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) provides that "[w]hoever knowingly or willfully ...
[makes] any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President
of the United States... shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
69. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
70. E.g., Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment
Framework for Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
635,642-43 (2000).
71. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. The defendant's statement was made partly in reference to
his opposition to being inducted into the Armed Forces after having received his draft classi-
fication. Id.
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whether the comment rose to the level of a "true threat., 72 Specifically, the
Court found three factual considerations significant.73
First, the Court cited the political backdrop in which the statements
were made.74 Political speech made in the context of a public rally is gener-
ally the type of speech awarded the highest constitutional protection." The
Watts court reflected this sentiment by acknowledging our "profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
,,76uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, even when speech results in unpleas-
ant and offensive attacks on government officials. 7 7 Second, the Court noted
the statement's expressly conditional nature.78 Watts conditioned his threat
upon his being inducted into the Armed Forces, something he suggested
would never occur because he intended not to appear for his mandatory
physical after receiving his draft classification.7 9 Finally, the Court found
significant the reaction-both Watts and the crowd laughed--of those who
heard the statement.
80
Considering Watts's statement against these factors, the Court found
that he had not issued a true threat.8' Watts consequently held that true
threats of violence do not fall under First Amendment protection, but failed
to provide a precise definition of a true threat.
82
Subsequent Supreme Court cases also fail to provide further specificity
as to what constitutes a true threat.8 3 Until April 2003, NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co. 84 was the only other case where the Court directly addressed
the true threat exception to the First Amendment.85
72. Id. at 708.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Emily Calhoun, Initiative Petition Reforms and the First Amendment, 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 129, 130 (1995). Calhoun suggests that historically, most considered petitioning the
government to be a right superior to that of free speech. Id.




79. Id. at 706-07.
80. Id. at 707-08.
81. Id. at 708.
82. Pisciotta, supra note 70, at 642-43; Rothchild, supra note 66, at 213.
83. Rothchild, supra note 66, at 213.
84. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
85. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 283, 295-96 (2001). In April 2003 the Supreme Court confronted the true threat doc-
trine in Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003). Addressing the doctrine in the context of
the intimidation resulting from cross burning, the Court said, '"[t]rue threats' encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Id.
at 1548. The Court further noted that the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
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In NAACP the Court considered whether Charles Evers, Field Secre-
tary for the NAACP in Mississippi, had uttered protected or proscribable
speech in a series of public speeches to supporters of a local boycott.86 In
the speeches Evers allegedly said that those who broke the boycott would
"have their necks broken." 87 The Court found these statements to be pro-
tected speech, though the Court focused much of its discussion on the Bran-
denburg8 incitement test rather than the true threat doctrine.89 While the
Court only mentioned Watts in a footnote, 90 it is important to note what the
Court relied upon in dismissing the claim that Evers's speech constituted a
true threat. As in Watts, the Court considered the political context of the
speech to be significant.9' Considered against this backdrop, the Court
found Evers's speech to be more akin to the political rhetoric found permis-
sible in Watts.92
Taken together, Watts and NAACP provide the basic framework for the
true threat doctrine, but provide little specific guidance in determining when
speech rises to the level of a true threat. 93 Given this lack of guidance, fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal have struggled to develop a workable "true
threat" definition since Watts and NAACP.
94
2. The Circuit Split: Reasonable Speaker Versus Reasonable Recipient
In developing the true threats doctrine, the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals generally have adopted an objective test that considers whether a rea-
sonable person would consider the alleged threat to be a serious expression
of an intent to cause harm.95 The individual circuits, however, are nearly
threat and said that "[i]ntimidation ... is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat
to a person... with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death." Id. Even
if Virginia v. Black had been decided before Doe, it does not appear that it would have al-
tered the Doe court's analysis. Except for articulating a definition of a "true threat," Virginia
v. Black does not appear to modify the doctrine.
86. NAACP, 458 U.S. at 886.
87. Id. at 900 n.28. There is some factual dispute over what Evers actually said.
Rothman, supra note 85, at 299-300. Rothman notes that one witness believed Evers said
"[i]f you break the boycott your own people will break your necks,"--constituting a warning
rather than a threat. Id. Rothman suggests that this factual uncertainty might have made the
Court hesitant to deem Evers's statements a threat. Id.
88. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg the Su-
preme Court held that a state may prohibit advocacy of the use of force or of lawless action if
such advocacy is likely to produce imminent lawless action or force. Id. at 447.
89. NAACP, 458 U.S. at 927-29.
90. Id. at 928 n.71.
91. See id. at 926-29.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 82 and cited sources.
94. Pisciotta, supra note 70, at 642-45.
95. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that other
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evenly split on whether to apply this objective test from the perspective of a
reasonable speaker or a reasonable recipient.
96
For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has adopted a reasonable speaker approach and construes a true threat based
upon whether a reasonable speaker would foresee that the recipient would
interpret the statement to be a serious expression of intent to harm or as-
sault.9 7 Some variation of this test has been implemented by at least four
other circuits. 98 The Fourth Circuit, however, has adopted a reasonable re-
cipient approach that considers whether a reasonable recipient who is famil-
iar with the context would interpret the statement as a threat.99 Though the
phrasing varies from circuit to circuit, five other circuits use this listener-
based approach in some form. 0 0
The distinction between these two approaches has been the subject of
much scholarly analysis, but the practical effect of adopting one test over
the other is relatively insignificant.10 1 The outcome will be the same in the
vast majority of cases regardless of whether the court analyzes the speech in
question from the vantage point of a reasonable speaker or a reasonable
listener.' 2 As one commentator noted, "To foresee how a listener would
react to a threat, the only frame of reference a reasonable speaker would
have is how the speaker would react ...if he were himself a listener."'
10 3
Additionally, the difference takes on less significance in practice because
most circuits consider subjective factors-such as how the specific recipient
reacted to the speech-in determining how a reasonable person would per-
circuits have adopted an objective test applied from the vantage point of either a reasonable
person making the statement or a reasonable person receiving the statement).
96. See Rothman, supra note 85, at 302. The author gives a useful overview of the vari-
ous circuit approaches, citing the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as adopting
some form of a reasonable speaker test, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
D.C. circuits as using some variation of a reasonable recipient test. Id. at 302-05. The author
further notes that the Second Circuit has split from the pack and has added an imminence
requirement to its reasonable recipient test. Id. at 306 (citing United States v. Kelner, 534
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976)).
97. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996). Lovell is
unique because it applied the true threats doctrine to student speech uttered in a public school
context. Id. at 371. There a school counselor alleged that the student walked into her office
and said, "If you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!" Id. at 369.
The Ninth Circuit held the speech to constitute a true threat, finding that a reasonable person
in the student's position would foresee that the counselor would interpret the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm. Id. at 372-73.
98. For a list of these circuits, see supra note 96.
99. United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. For a list of the circuits applying this test, see supra note 96.
101. E.g., Rothman, supra note 85, at 303.
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ceive the threat. 104 Despite the relative insignificance of the particular ap-
proach used, most all of the various circuits have adopted one approach over
the other.
105
a. The Eighth Circuit "reasonable recipient" approach
The Eighth Circuit falls into the group of circuits having adopted the
reasonable recipient approach. 0 6 In United States v. Dinwiddie,10 7 the
Eighth Circuit held that whether a statement was a true threat depended
upon "whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude
that it expresses 'a determination or intent to injure presently or in the fu-
ture."' 108 Furthermore, the court said that the particular threat must be ana-
lyzed "in the light of [its] entire factual context."'0 9
In Dinwiddie a pro-life advocate made pointed threats to physicians
who performed abortions at the Planned Parenthood of Greater Kansas City
clinic. 110 Over the course of a year and with the aid of a bullhorn, Mrs.
Dinwiddie made more than fifty offensive statements, including such com-
ments as, "Patty, you have not seen violence yet until you see what we do to
you" and "Robert, remember Dr. Gunn [a physician who was killed by an
abortion opponent in 1993] .... This could happen to you. .. .,"' Examin-
ing these comments within their entire factual context, the Eighth Circuit
found that Dinwiddie's comments constituted a threat of force." 
2
b. The Dinwiddie factors
In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Dinwiddie's
comments against several specific factors to determine how a reasonable
recipient might perceive the alleged threats." 3 The factors used by the Din-
widdie court include: the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other
listeners, 1 14 whether the threat was conditional,' 15 whether the threat was
104. Id.
105. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
106. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Martin v.
United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982). In Martin the Eighth Circuit adopted the
Fourth Circuit's approach, which considers a statement from the standpoint of a reasonable
recipient familiar with the context of the communication. Id.
107. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 925 (quoting Martin, 691 F.2d at 1240).
109. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1306 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
110. Id. at 917.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 926.
113. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925.
114. Id. (citing United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 1994)).
115. Id. (citing United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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communicated directly to the victim,' ' 6 whether the maker of the threat had
made similar statements to the victim in the past," 7 and whether the victim
had reason to believe the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in
violence." 8 The court noted that the presence or absence of any one of these
factors was not dispositive. 119 In light of these factors, the court found that a
reasonable recipient would consider Dinwiddie's comments a true threat. 
20
The Eighth Circuit has applied the Dinwiddie factors in subsequent
cases, 12 but courts in other circuits have used slightly varying factors to
determine how a reasonable person would perceive an alleged threat.
22
3. The Relevance of Intent
An additional issue of importance is the relevance of a speaker's intent
when making a purported threat. The courts generally have rejected the no-
tion that a speaker must have intended to carry out the threat or have had the
capacity to carry out the threat before the threat is proscribable under the
true threat doctrine. 23 The rejection of this notion is attributable to the very
reasons underlying why threats of violence are proscribable in the first
place. 124 As the Supreme Court noted in R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul,
125
threats fall outside First Amendment protection because of a desire to pro-
tect individuals from the fears and harms arising from such threats.
26
Basing the constitutionality of a purported threat upon whether a speaker
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1994)).
118. Id.
119. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925 (citing Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322) (finding that even a
conditional threat may constitute a "true threat").
120. Id. at 926. The Eighth Circuit, comparing Dinwiddie's comments to those made in
Watts, found that Dinwiddie's statements were not conditional, the recipient of the state-
ments responded by wearing a bullet-proof vest, and the statements were communicated
directly to the recipient by use of a bullhorn. Id. On these facts, the court found Mrs. Din-
widdie's comments to be substantially more threatening than those made in Watts. ld.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071-74 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying
the Dinwiddie factors to find that an anti-abortion activist who parked and then abandoned
two Ryder trucks in the driveways of two local abortion clinics was guilty of making a "true
threat").
122. See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 858-59 (Pa. 2002); see
also infra note 176 and accompanying text.
123. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1023
(2d Cir. 1976) (considering whether a threat to assassinate Yasser Arafat was punishable
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce a threat
to injure another person).
124. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1076.
125. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
126. Id. at 388; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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actually intended to carry the threat out would not serve these purposes.
127
An intent requirement would instead minimize the significance of the re-
cipient's perceived harm. 28 For these reasons circuit courts generally have
refused to require a showing that the speaker intended to carry out his
threat. 1
29
In contrast, courts consistently have required a speaker to intentionally
or knowingly communicate the threat to someone before the state may dis-
cipline the speaker for the alleged threat.' 30 In most true threat cases, how-
ever, whether a speaker intended to communicate the threat requires little
analysis.' 3' A cursory look at the facts usually establishes the speaker's in-
tent to communicate.' 32 But, when there is a factual dispute as to whether
the speaker intended to communicate the alleged threat, intent to communi-
cate becomes a threshold question.'
33
B. Ptullic School Jurisprudence
To fully understand Doe,134 an analysis must extend beyond true threat
jurisprudence. Because K.G. read J.M.'s letter on school grounds and be-
cause a public school authority disciplined him, the analysis must necessar-
ily examine free speech jurisprudence as it relates to the context of secon-
dary public schools. Three areas will be particularly insightful in consider-
ing the Doe case: the scope of student rights for "on campus" speech, 35 a
school's authority to limit "off campus" student speech, 136 and the tradition
of judicial deference to local school board decisions.1
37
127. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1076.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 123.
130. E.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).
131. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (examining a protestor
who communicated purported threat to President Johnson directly to a crowd gathered
around him at a Washington, D.C. rally); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367,
369 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that student made threatening remarks directly to school coun-
selor); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing an anti-
abortion advocate who used bullhorn to make more than fifty threatening remarks directly to
physicians as they entered an abortion clinic).
132. See supra note 13 1 (citing cases that demonstrate the notion that the facts of the case
often establish an intent to communicate without any analysis by the court).
133. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624-25 (8th Cir. 2002).
Because of the unique nature of its facts, Doe appears to be one of the only cases to exten-
sively examine whether the speaker actually intended to communicate the threat. As noted by
the court in Doe, this issue was a determinative factor in deciding whether the school district
could punish J.M. for making the alleged threat. Id.
134. Id. at 616.
135. See infra Part III.B.1.
136. See infra Part III.B.2.
137. See infra Part III.B.3.
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1. Scope of Student Rights for "On campus" Speech
Although it is recognized that freedom of speech is not an absolute
right, for public school students the First Amendment offers even fewer
protections. 138 Any analysis of student free speech rights begins with the
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District. 39 In Tinker three students wore black armbands to school in pro-
test of the Vietnam War. 140 The school subsequently suspended the students
for violating a school policy.' 4' In overturning the students' suspensions, the
United States Supreme Court emphasized that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."' 142 The Court limited this seemingly expansive view of student speech
rights, however, by holding that First Amendment protection did not extend
to speech that materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disor-
der.
43
Tinker represents the high-water mark for student expression because
in later years the Court greatly scaled back student speech rights. 144 Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser45 established the first exception to Tinker
in holding that a school may prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive lan-
guage if the speech is inconsistent with the school's basic educational mis-
sion. 146 Two years later, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier147 estab-
lished the second exception when the Court held that schools can limit oth-
erwise protected student speech if that speech arises in the context of
138. See generally Leonard M. Niehoff, The Student's Right to Freedom of Speech: How
Much Is Left at the Schoolhouse Gate?, 75 MICH. B.J. 1150 (1996).
139. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
140. Id. at 504.
141. Id.
142. ld. at 506.
143. Id. at 509.
144. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see also Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
145. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Fraser, a high school student included sexual innuendo and
offensive terms in a speech given during a school assembly in support of a classmate running
for class office. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the student's suspension, citing the school's
interest in prohibiting the use of vulgar and offensive language in public discourse. Id. at
683.
146. Id. at 685.
147. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood high school students wrote and edited a news-
paper as part of a journalism class. Id. at 262. The principal reviewed the paper and removed
two pages that dealt with what he considered to be controversial topics such as student preg-
nancy, birth control, and the effect of divorce on students. Id. at 263-64. The Supreme Court
upheld the school's right to censor such school-sponsored speech where its actions are re-
lated to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. at 273.
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school-sponsored activities and the school's censorship is reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
48
This trilogy of cases forms the basic framework of free speech juris-
prudence in public schools. 49 More specifically, the cases constitute the
bedrock of law for student speech occurring on campus.' 50 As scholars have
reasoned and some lower courts have acknowledged, Tinker's assertion that
student rights do not end at the schoolhouse gate draws a distinction be-
tween the rights of students outside school and their rights while in
school.' 5' Scholars assert that the clear inference to be drawn from these
Supreme Court cases is that a school's authority over student speech gener-
ally ends when the students leave school. 52 Despite such assertions, lower
court decisions have failed to establish a clear standard for determining
when a school is within its authority to proscribe off campus student
speech. 
53
148. Id. at 273.
149. See Miller, supra note 3, at 626.
150. See Clay Calvert, Off campus Speech, On campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 243,270-71 (2001).
151. See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340-41 (S.D. Tex.
1969), vacated by 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). In the first post-Tinker case addressing a
school's authority to punish off campus speech, the court said:
[Ilt makes little sense to extend the influence of school administration to off
campus activity under the theory that such activity might interfere with the func-
tion of education. School officials may not judge a student's behavior while he is
in his home with his family nor does it seem to this court that they should have
jurisdiction over his acts on a public street comer. A student is subject to the
same criminal laws and owes the same civil duties as other citizens, and his
status as a student should not alter his obligations to others during his private life
away from the campus.
Id.; see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d
Cir. 1979) ("When school officials are authorized only to punish speech on school property,
the student is free to speak his mind when the school day ends."); Leora Harpaz, Internet
Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
123, 142 (2000).
152. Harpaz, supra note 151, at 142; Calvert, supra note 150, at 252. But cf Donovan v.
Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a school official's determination that
on campus distribution of an underground newspaper written off campus was a sufficient
link to justify the school's authority to discipline the students); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (upholding school's authority to punish an off campus student
website on grounds that it created a material and substantial disruption at the school).
153. See Student Press Law Ctr. CyberGuide, A Legal Manual for Online Publishers of
Independent Student Web Sites (2001), at http://www.splc.org/printpage
.asp?id= 1 3&tb=legal research [hereinafter CyberGuide].
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2. School Authority over "Off campus" Speech
While there are no Supreme Court cases addressing a school's author-
ity to discipline off campus student speech, 54 several lower court decisions
are representative of the trend of law governing the scope of student rights
within this context. 1 5 The starting point is Thomas v. Board of Education,
Granville Central School District,'56 a 1979 case in which a high school
suspended five students for publishing and distributing an off campus
magazine containing "morally offensive, indecent, and obscene" material. 1
57
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the
suspensions, finding that the school had exceeded its authority in disciplin-
ing the students for what amounted to off campus speech. 158 The court, ac-
knowledging that school officials may only punish speech on school prop-
erty, held that a student is "free to speak his mind when the school day
ends."1
59
Klein v. Smith 160 considered whether a school had the authority to dis-
cipline a student who made a vulgar gesture toward a teacher in a restaurant
parking lot. 161 The gesture took place off school premises and after school
hours. 162 The student sued the school district after it suspended him for ten
days for violating a school rule prohibiting vulgar language or conduct di-
rected toward school staff.16 3 The district court overturned the suspension,
finding the link between the off campus gesture and a disruption of the or-
derly operation of the school too remote to support disciplining the stu-
dent.'64
In contrast to the clear boundary established by Thomas and Klein,
some lower courts have supported attempts to extend school authority over
off campus student speech when the speech has a disruptive effect on cam-
pus or where the speech is linked to some on campus event.
65
For instance, in Boucher v. School Board of the School District of
Greenfield,166 the Seventh Circuit vacated a temporary injunction in favor of
a student who had been expelled for writing an article in an underground
154. Harpaz, supra note 151, at 142.
155. See infra Part 111.1.2 for a discussion of the relevant lower court cases.
156. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. Id. at 1046.
158. Id. at 1050.
159. Id. at 1052.
160. 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
161. Id. at 1440-41.
162. Id. at 1441.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See CyberGuide, supra note 153.
166. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
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newspaper instructing readers how to hack into school computers.
67
Though no evidence showed that the student author distributed the paper on
campus or that he used school resources to produce the article, the court
applied a Tinker analysis and found that the speech could lead school offi-
cials to reasonably forecast substantial disruption of school activities.
68
A fast-growing category of cases involving on campus punishment for
arguably off campus expression is that concerning student speech on the
Internet.169 Most of these cases involve situations where students create and
maintain off campus websites that are somehow brought to the attention of
school officials.170 A few courts have denied the school's disciplinary au-
thority on the sole basis that the website clearly was off campus speech un-
related to the operation of the school.' 71 Some courts, however, have evalu-
ated Internet speech under the Tinker analysis of material and substantial
disruption. 1
72
One of the few cases to support school officials in a dispute involving
off campus Internet speech is J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District. 173 This
case is particularly insightful because the court analyzed the speech under
both a true threats and a Tinker analysis. 74 In J.S. a school expelled a stu-
dent for creating an off campus website that included insulting and deroga-
tory comments about a teacher and the principal, a picture of the teacher's
severed head dripping with blood, and a request that visitors to the site con-
tribute funds to pay for a hitman to deal with the teacher. 75 Applying fac-
tors similar to those outlined in Dinwiddie, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that the Internet speech did not constitute a true threat. 76 The court
167. Id. at 822-23.
168. Id. at 827-29.
169. Calvert, supra note 150, at 244-45.
170. See generally Bettina Brownstein, Student Rights and the Internet, ARK. LAW.,
Winter 2002, at 8-12.
171. E.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
172. See Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(applying Tinker but finding that a student's off campus email did not create a disruption at
the school); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (applying Tinker but finding that an off campus website created no substantial or mate-
rial disruption of the school).
173. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). Interestingly, the Honorable Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Judge
of the Court of Common Pleas for Northampton County, Pennsylvania,-the court which
heard the student's initial appeal-wrote an article appearing in the Dickinson Law Review
which discussed the J.S. case. See Honorable Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Limits on Students'
Speech in the Internet Age, 105 DICK. L. REV. 181 (2001).
174. SeeJ.S., 807 A.2d at 856-59, 868-69.
175. Id. at 851.
176. Id. at 859. The court found that the threats were unconditional, but determined that
the student did not communicate the threats directly to the recipient, that the student had not
made similar statements to the recipient before, and that no evidence showed that the recipi-
ent had reason to believe that the student had the propensity to engage in violence. Id.
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went on to find, however, that the website constituted on campus speech
since the student accessed the site on a school computer in a classroom.
77
Applying Tinker, the court held that the website caused disruption of the
entire school community, and the school did not, therefore, violate the stu-
dent's First Amendment rights by expelling him.1
78
In contrast, Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District179 is representa-
tive of the trend of cases where courts have protected off campus student
speech. 80 In Beussink a Missouri high school student created a website at
home which used crude and vulgar language to criticize the school, teach-
ers, and administrators.' 8' The court found that the student created the web-
site completely off campus and did not deliberately bring its contents onto
campus. 182 Despite this finding, the court, with little explanation, applied the
Tinker standard but found that the website did not substantially interfere
with school discipline. 8 3 On this factual determination, the court held that
the school had violated Beussink's First Amendment rights.1
84
Considered as a whole, this group of cases has failed to establish clear
guidance as to how far the First Amendment extends in protecting off cam-
pus student speech on the Internet. 85 Many courts have extended Tinker to
apply to off campus speech, while others have refused to recognize the
school's disciplinary authority simply because of the speech's off campus
origin.186 Clearly, the state of the law concerning off campus Internet speech
remains an open question. 187 But, while the courts have showed little consis-
tency in the analyses used to reach their decisions, most courts have decided
in favor of student speech. 
88
177. Id. at 865. The court stated that it would consider speech to be on campus speech if
it is aimed at a specific school or its personnel and is brought onto the school campus or
accessed at school by its originator. Id.
178. Id. at 869.
179. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Missouri was the first court to render a verdict in a case involving school
punishment for a student's off campus Internet use. See CyberGuide, supra note 153.
180. See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
181. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1180-81.
184. Id. at 1182. The court granted Beussink's request for preliminary injunctive relief.
Id. Specifically, the court enjoined the school district from considering Beussink's ten-day
suspension in applying the school's absenteeism policy when calculating his semester grades.
Id. If the ten-day suspension applied, Beussink would fail four of his subjects. Id. at 1181.
The court order also enjoined the district from prohibiting Beussink from reposting the web-
site on his home computer. Id. at 1182.
185. See CyberGuide, supra note 153.
186. See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
187. Brownstein, supra note 170, at 12.
188. See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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3. Judicial Deference to Local School Board Decisions
An additional judicial policy to be examined is the tradition of judicial
deference to the decisions of local school authorities. 89 Local control is a
fundamental tenet of our nation's public education system. 190 This national
value has led to the practice of judicial bodies granting tremendous defer-
ence to the decisions of local school boards.19' The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that courts should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts
that "arise in the daily operation of our public school[s].' 92
With this general custom of deference, however, come certain limits. 1
93
Courts still have an obligation to ensure that school boards exercise their
powers in a manner that complies with the protections afforded under the
First Amendment.194 When a local school authority's exercise of power
results in an abuse of discretion, courts have the license to step in and pro-
vide a remedy. 95 Despite these limitations, most courts are hesitant to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of local school authority.1
96
189. Though the issue of judicial deference to local school authority is not a substantive
issue of law generally considered in judicial decisions, it is a policy consideration that per-
meates constitutional law. See James Scott McClain, The Voting Rights Act and Local School
Boards: An Argument for Deference to Educational Policy in Remedies for Vote Dilution, 67
TEX. L. REV. 139, 176 (1988).
190. See Julie Goyer, Student First Amendment Rights in the Public School Setting: A
Topic of increased Litigation, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 163, 163-65 (1982).
191. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968) (acknowledging the
tremendous deference given to local education authorities and noting that courts should not
interfere unless there is clearly a constitutional issue at hand). But see Bowman v. Pulaski
County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that courts
must ordinarily defer to the judgment of the school board, but further noting that the court is
"not so obligated when the exercise of power constitutes an abuse of discretion"). Note that
the deference given to local schools in making disciplinary decisions has greatly increased in
the wake of the highly-publicized school shootings of the past several years. David L. Hud-
son, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights,
Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 199, 200 (2000).
192. E.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
193. See Bowman, 723 F.2d at 645; see also Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d
1068, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1997).
194. See Stark, 123 F.3d at 1072-73 (citing Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84
(1987)).
195. E.g., Bowman, 723 F.2d at 645 (upholding the reversal of a school board decision to
involuntarily transfer two assistant high school football coaches after they spoke out in a
public debate).
196. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (holding that the Civil
Rights Act is not to be a method for federal courts to correct what they perceive to be errors





In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 197 a split Eighth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, held that a student's violent and obscenity-laden letter
constituted a true threat and that the school district, therefore, did not violate
his First Amendment rights by expelling him. 
98
1. Mootness and Standard of Review
As a preliminary matter, the court addressed J.M.'s argument that his
First Amendment claim was moot because he had already completed the
eighth grade.199 The majority acknowledged that courts must dismiss ap-
peals as moot when the decision will have no effect for either party,200 but
disagreed that J.M.'s case presented such a situation.2 0' The court reasoned
that a reversal of the district court decision would result in the school dis-
trict being able to document the incident in J.M.'s student records20 2 or in
considering the incident in determining J.M.'s current privileges as a stu-
dent.20 3 The court also cited the school district's interest in a judicial deter-
mination of whether it acted constitutionally in applying its rule prohibiting
terroristic threats.
20 4
The court addressed an additional preliminary matter in establishing
the appropriate standard of review for a First Amendment claim.205 Citing
197. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
198. Id. at 626-27. Judge Hansen authored the majority opinion, which was joined by
Judges Bowman, Loken, Murphy, and Riley. Id. at 618. The Honorable Roger L. Wollman
stepped down as Chief Judge on January 31, 2002-after oral arguments in this case were
presented but before the opinion was written-and was succeeded as Chief Judge by Judge
Hansen. See id. at 618 n. 1.
199. Id. at 620-21. J.M. originally brought suit in district court in November 2000 during
the fall semester of his eighth-grade year. See id. The Eighth Circuit's en banc opinion was
not issued until September 2002, at which point J.M. had already completed the eighth grade.
Id. at 616, 621.
200. Id. at 621 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12
(1992)).
201. Id.
202. Id. The district court required the school board to expunge any mention of the inci-
dent from J.M.'s school records. Id.
203. Doe, 306 F.3d at 621. As an example, the court noted that if it reversed the district
court, the school district might consider the Rule 36 violation in determining whether the
school could exclude J.M. from a class in which K.G. is enrolled. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. An appellate court normally would review a district court's factual findings for
clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id. (citing Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d
980, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 6 the court noted that it must adopt a
heightened level of scrutiny when considering a First Amendment claim.
20 7
Specifically, the court said it must make an "independent examination of the
whole record, ' 20 8 using a de novo standard for facts relevant to the free
speech issue but still using a clear error standard for facts not implicating
the First Amendment claim.20 9 The court said it would continue to use a de
novo standard of review in considering conclusions of law.
2 1 0
2. True Threat Inquiry
Before proceeding to the heart of its analysis, the court examined the
history of the true threat doctrine, the various approaches adopted by the
federal courts of appeals, and the particular true threat test the Eighth Cir-
cuit has adopted.2 '
The court began this discussion by establishing that threats of violence
are among the types of speech the government can limit without violating
the First Amendment.212 According to the court, the government has an in-
terest in "protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disrup-
tion that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur., 2 13 The court then explained that, because Watts and sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions provide no specific definition of a "true
threat," lower courts have been left to determine for themselves when
214speech rises to the level of a true threat.
The court next discussed the differing true threat analyses adopted by
the federal courts of appeals.21 5 After distinguishing the reasonable speaker
from the reasonable recipient test, the court declared itself to be among
those courts adopting the reasonable recipient approach.1 6 Further clarify-
206. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
207. Doe, 306 F.3d at 621.
208. Id. (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285).
209. Id. Though not bound by the district court's findings, the court said it "remain[ed]
cognizant that the district court is in the best seat to observe the demeanor of the witnesses."
Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
567 (1995)).
210. Id.
211. id. at 622-24.
212. Id. at 622 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)). For the particular
facts and holdings of Watts, see supra Part III.A. 1.
213. Doe, 306 F.3d. at 622 (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)).
214. Id. For a detailed discussion of how lower courts have treated the true threat doc-
trine, see supra Part III.A.2.
215. Doe, 306 F.3d. at 622; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
216. Doe, 306 F.3d. at 622. Later in its opinion, the court addressed the fact that the
Eighth Circuit panel first weighing in on this case employed the Ninth Circuit's reasonable
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ing its true threat analysis, the court then outlined the factors used in United
States v. Dinwiddie21 7 to determine how a reasonable recipient would view
an alleged threat.2 18 These factors consist of the following:
(1) the reaction of those who heard the alleged threat; (2) whether the
threat was conditional; (3) whether the person who made the alleged
threat communicated it directly to the object of the threat; (4) whether
the speaker had a history of making threats against the person purport-
edly threatened; and (5) whether the recipient had a reason to believe
that the speaker had a propensity to engage in violence.21
9
The court thus enumerated its true threat analysis as one that adheres to
the inquiry used in Dinwiddie and that defines a true threat as "a statement
that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of
an intent to harm or cause injury to another."
2 0
3. Intent to Communicate
Before discussing whether J.M.'s letter constituted a threat, the Eighth
Circuit addressed what it considered a threshold question: whether J.M.
intended to communicate the purported threat.22' The court emphasized that
a speaker must have intentionally or knowingly communicated the alleged
threat to someone before the state may proscribe the speech.2 2 The court
speaker test to determine whether J.M.'s letter was a true threat. Id. at 623. Considering the
panel's reliance on the reasonable speaker test and the First Circuit's past criticism of the
reasonable recipient test, the Eighth Circuit was compelled to address whether its adoption of
the reasonable recipient approach was justified. Id.; see United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d
1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997). The court, adhering to its previous use of the reasonable recipient
test, noted that differences in the two tests were largely academic, and the fact that a recipient
approach must in all cases be reasonable alleviated the First Circuit's concerns. Doe, 306
F.3d at 623-24.
217. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
218. Doe, 306 F.3d at 623. See supra Part IlI.A.2.b for a discussion of the Dinwiddie
factors.
219. Doe, 306 F.3d at 623 (citing Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925).
220. Id. at 624.
221. Id. The court said the district court's determination that the letter was protected
speech turned on its finding that J.M. never intended to communicate the threat to K.G. Id.
See supra Part III.A.3 for further discussion of the relevance of speaker intent in a true threat
analysis.
222. Doe, 306 F.3d at 624 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc.
v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (2d Cir. 1994)). The court said that
"[r]equiring less than an intent to communicate ...would run afoul of the notion that an
individual's most protected right is to be free from governmental interference in the sanctity
of his home and in the sanctity of his own personal thoughts." Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969)).
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then noted that either communicating the statement directly to the target of
the purported threat or to a third party would satisfy this requirement.223
Applying the facts to this framework, the court found that J.M. in-
tended to communicate the contents of the letter.2 24 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court found several facts significant.225 First, J.M. permitted D.M.
to read the letter.22 6 The court considered this especially problematic
because J.M. testified that he knew D.M. was likely to tell K.G. about the
letter.2 27 Second, J.M. discussed the letter with K.G. in more than one phone
conversation, including telling her that he wrote the letter and that the letter
talked of killing her.228 Finally, the court noted that J.M. told K.G.'s best
friend about his desire to kill K.G. knowing that the friend was likely to
relay these comments to K.G. 229 Based on these facts, the court found that
J.M. did not intend to keep the letter private.
230
4. Reasonable Recipient's Perception of the Letter
Having established that J.M. intended to communicate the letter, the
court next considered whether a reasonable recipient would have perceived
the letter as a true threat.231 After a brief discussion establishing the letter's
clear intent to harm and its clearly threatening nature,232 the court proceeded
to apply a rough equivalent of the Dinwiddie factors to the facts of the
case.
23 3
First, the court noted that the letter stated in unconditional terms that
K.G. should not go to sleep because J.M. would be lying under her bed
234waiting to kill her with a knife. Second, while J.M. did not personally
223. Id. The court cited two cases to support the notion that communication to a third
party is sufficient for a true threat analysis. Id. United States v. Crews concerned the convic-
tion of a man who told a third party he intended to kill the President of the United States in
violation of a federal statute. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986). In State v. Chung, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii found that a defendant's statements to other teachers that he would kill the
principal were true threats. 862 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Haw. 1993).
224. Doe, 306 F.3d at 624.
225. See id. at 624-25.
226. Id. at 624.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 625.
229. Id. at 626.
230. Doe, 306 F.3d at 625.
231. Id.
232. Id. In making this finding, the court relied upon the offensive, vulgar, and threaten-
ing language used in the letter. Id. The court also noted its disagreement with the district
court's characterization of the letter as "only 'arguably' threatening." Id.
233. Id. at 623; see supra Part IV.A.2.
234. Doe, 306 F.3d at 625. The court said that most thirteen-year-old girls and most
reasonable adults would fear for their physical well-being if they received the same letter. Id.
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deliver the letter to K.G., the intimate and personal nature of the letter made
it appear as if J.M. were speaking directly to K.G. as he wrote the letter.235
Next, the court considered significant the fact that J.M. never attempted to
alleviate K.G.'s concerns about the letter prior to her obtaining it.236 The
court found that it appeared that J.M. wanted to scare K.G. as retribution for
the break-up and that he did not apologize until after the school board ex-
pelled him.
23 7
The court next examined the reactions of those who read the letter.238
The court specifically noted that D.M. considered the letter serious enough
that he stole it from his best friend's house,239 that a girl present when K.G.
first read the letter was so concerned that she immediately told the school
resource officer about the letter,240 and that K.G. cried and was scared to
leave the gym upon reading the letter.241 K.G. also slept with the lights on
for several nights after reading the letter and was so frightened that she left
school early on the day J.M. returned to school after being temporarily re-
instated.242 Based upon these reactions, the court concluded that those who
read the letter clearly considered it to be a threat.
243
Finally, the court said that J.M.'s previous portrayal of himself as a
"tough guy" made his threat more credible to K.G.244 The court specifically
relied upon K.G.'s testimony that J.M. told her he was a member of the
235. Id. In support of this finding, the court cited United States v. Belirichard, which
recognized that a statement directed to a person's home or work is more likely to be per-
ceived as a threat than a statement delivered at a public gathering. 994 F.2d. 1318, 1321 (8th
Cir. 1995). In an interview on CNN's Connie Chung Tonight program, Gregory T. Jones, the
attorney who represented the school district, noted that the letter was extremely personal
given that it contained K.G.'s address. Connie Chung Tonight (CNN television broadcast,
Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS /0209/26/cct.00.html).
CNN legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin further pointed out that the letter also included K.G.'s
phone number. Id.
236. Doe, 306 F.3d at 625. The court found that J.M. discussed the letter with K.G.
knowing that she might have taken the threat as truthful. Id. The court also noted that J.M. let
D.M. read the letter and told K.G.'s best friend about wanting to kill K.G., knowing that both
were likely to relay this information to K.G. Id.
237. Id. at 625-26.
238. Id. at 626.
239. Id. In testimony at trial, D.M. said he stole a copy of the letter because he "felt that
something should be done about it." Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 302).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Doe, 306 F.3d at 626.
243. Id. On this point, the court again emphasized the relevance of a listener's reaction in
determining whether speech constitutes a threat. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969)).
244. Id. The district court refused to consider the school district's evidence of J.M.'s
violent tendencies since the school board did not consider this evidence. ld. The Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded, however, that the evidence was relevant to determining whether K.G.'s reac-
tion to the letter was reasonable. Id.
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"Bloods" gang and that he had once shot a cat while speaking to K.G. on the
phone.245
Upon this factual analysis, the court concluded that, because a reason-
able recipient would consider J.M.'s letter to be "a serious expression of an
intent to harm K.G.," the letter constituted a true threat.246 The court held
that the school board did not violate J.M.'s First Amendment rights by ex-
pelling him for writing the letter, but observed that the school district's pun-
ishment appeared to be unnecessarily harsh.247 Nevertheless, the court said,
"[i]t is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school ad-
ministrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or com-
,,248Ontipassion. On this finding, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision and remanded the case with instructions to dissolve J.M.'s injunc-




The first of the two dissenting opinions opened by criticizing the ma-
jority for ignoring the school context analysis of this case.250 The minority
said the proper inquiry is whether J.M.'s letter is protected speech or a true
threat, and if it is protected speech, whether it is subject to discipline be-
cause it may cause substantial disruption of the school. 25' Addressing these
questions, the minority said it would hold that the letter was protected
speech, but that the school district could reasonably regulate the speech to
prevent a substantial disruption of the school.252
1. True Threat Analysis
The minority agreed With the majority's use of the reasonable recipient
test but said the majority failed to include analysis of how the Dinwiddie
standard is applied. 53 Comparing the facts of Dinwiddie to those in the pre-
245. Id. The court noted that K.G. testified at trial that J.M.'s violence towards animals
made her more concerned about the letter. Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 262-63).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 627.
248. Doe, 306 F.3d at 627 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975)).
249. Id.
250. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The first dissenting opinion was written by Judge
Heaney and joined by Judges Morris Sheppard Arnold, Bye, and McMillian. Id. (Heaney, J.,
dissenting). Judge McMillian also filed a separate dissent. Id. at 636 (McMillian, J., dissent-
ing).
251. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 627 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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sent case, the minority said it failed to see how the majority could conclude
that J.M.'s letter rose to the level of a true threat as established in Dinwid-
die.
254
2. Intent to Communicate
Heaney's dissenting opinion next disagreed with the majority's finding
that J.M. intended to communicate a threat to K.G. by allowing D.M. to
read the letter. 5 The minority said that whether J.M. intended to communi-
cate a threat is a finding of fact that the court should review by a clearly
erroneous standard.256 According to the minority, instead of deferring to the
district court's reasonable factual findings, the majority attempted to turn
the issue into a question of law. 57 The minority specifically criticized the
legal authority the majority cited in support of its finding that J.M.'s acqui-
escence to D.M.'s request to read the letter amounted to communication of a
threat.2 58 The dissent distinguished United States v. Crews259 on the basis
that, in that case, the violation of a federal statute prohibiting the making of
threats against the President to anyone precluded an analysis of the context
in which the statement was made. 260 The minority factually distinguished
State v. Chung261 from Doe to show that the majority's reliance on Chung
was misguided.262 Finally, the minority cited authority of its own supporting
the notion that "third-party knowledge of the contents of an alleged threat
against another is not enough to conclude that a true threat has been is-
sued., 263 Based upon these considerations, the minority opinion found that
J.M. did not intend to communicate the alleged threat.2 4
254. Doe, 306 F.3d at 628-29 (Heaney, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the facts in
Dinwiddie, see supra Part lIl.A.2.a.
255. Doe, 306 F.3d at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the standard of review used by the
majority, see supra Part IV.A. 1.
257. Doe, 306 F.3d at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority criticized United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d
826 (10th Cir. 1986), and State v. Chung, 862 P.2d 1063 (Haw. 1993), as lending little in-
sight to the Doe analysis.
259. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).
260. Doe, 306 F.3d at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
261. 862 P.2d 1063 (Haw. 1993).
262. Doe, 306 F.3d at 630 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority distinguished the facts
of Chung and Doe, noting that the defendant teacher in Chung had a history of mental illness,
showed fellow teachers the gun and ammunition he planned to use to kill the principal, had a
months-long strained relationship with the principal, violated his administrative leave by
being on campus, and initiated conversations with fellow teachers concerning his plan to kill
the principal. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. Arkansas, 78 Ark. App. 103, 78
S.W.3d 743 (2002)). The minority said that Roberts, while not binding authority, "accurately
and reasonably sets forth the analysis we should follow when reviewing an alleged intent to
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3. Reasonable Recipient's Perception of the Letter
The minority next addressed the issue of how a reasonable recipient
would perceive the letter.2 65 While the minority argued that J.M. did not
intend to communicate the letter, it said that even if it were able to find such
intent, it still would not consider the letter a true threat because a reasonable
recipient in K.G.'s position would not have viewed the letter as a threat.266
In reaching this conclusion the dissent dismissed each of the facts the
majority relied upon to find that a reasonable recipient would perceive the
letter as a threat.
267
First, the minority, while acknowledging that the letter's contents were
"chilling," said it would consider the letter within its entire context.268 Spe-
cifically, the minority emphasized that J.M. did not intend to communicate
the letter to K.G. and that it was not surprising that teenagers express them-
selves with aggression considering the violence observed in music, televi-
sion, video games, and for some, relationships at home. 69
Addressing J.M.'s acknowledgment that he wrote the letter, the minority
concluded that J.M.'s admission was inconclusive and that J.M. never is-
sued verbal threats against K.G. during their multiple telephone conversa-
tions. 270 The minority next stated its belief that it was unreasonable for K.G.
to believe that the letter was a true threat. 271 The minority found particularly
communicate a threat." Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 630-32 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 630 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 631 (Heaney, J., dissenting). These facts include "the contents of the letter,
that J.M. acknowledged that he had written the letter, that K.G. was upset and slept with the
lights on, and that J.M. told K.G. that he had shot a cat and was a member of the Bloods." Id.
(Heaney, J., dissenting).
268. Doe, 306 F.3d at 631 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority supported this finding
with language from the dissenting opinion in United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir.
1986) (Logan, J., dissenting). There, Judge Logan said:
When a threat is not communicated nor intended to be communicated to the ob-
ject of the statement, . . .some further evidence that the individual has done
more than think evil thoughts ought to be shown. Proof of actual intent to carry
out the threat is needed to demonstrate the reality of the threat itself. Any other
rule vests far too much power in the government at the expense of the individual.
Id. at 837.
269. Doe, 306 F.3d at 631 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that once J.M.'s social circle knew
about the contents of the letter, he denied having written it. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The
minority said this would lead one to conclude that J.M. was embarrassed about writing the
letter. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority noted that K.G.'s response, while relevant,
is not determinative because the objective standard used to analyze an alleged threat relies
upon a reasonable recipient's response. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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significant the fact that K.G.-though she knew who had written the letter's
disturbing contents and had even been read portions of the letter over the
telephone-failed to alert a parent, Sunday school teacher, or other adult
about the letter before it was brought to school.272 The minority thus found
it unreasonable for K.G. to have considered her life to be in danger.273
Finally, addressing the majority's reliance on J.M.'s tough guy reputation
to show that K.G. had reason to believe J.M. had a propensity for violence,
the dissent dismissed as teenage bravado J.M.'s claim that he was a member
of the Bloods and that he shot a cat while on the phone with K.G.274
In light of this factual analysis, the minority concluded that a reason-
able recipient would not consider the letter a true threat.275
4. School Board Action
Because the dissenting judges would find that J.M.'s letter was not a
true threat, they next turned to the issue of whether the school board acted
reasonably in regulating J.M.'s letter.276 While the majority deferred to the
school board's decision despite finding that the board's punishment was
unnecessarily harsh, the minority said it would consider the school board's
punishment of J.M. an abuse of discretion.277 The minority cited several
specific findings in concluding that the school board failed to exercise
sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making in its review of J.M.'s
speech.278 In its lengthy discussion of the school board proceedings, the
minority observed that the board failed to make a reasoned analysis of its
terroristic threat rule as applied to the facts of the case; the board seemingly
concluding before the hearing began that a threat had been issued; 279 the
board did not allow J.M. to explain his side of the story at the hearing;
280
one board member appeared to allow a family member's experience with
272. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 632 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
275. Doe, 306 F.3d at 632 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). Before addressing the school board's decision, the mi-
nority discussed the relevant background law concerning student speech as established in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Id. at 632-33. For further
discussion of the law governing student speech in a school setting, see supra Part III.B. 1.
277. Doe, 306 F.3d at 633, 636 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 633-36 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 634 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority said it would be unreasonable to
expect the school board to undertake a complex true threat analysis, but the board at a mini-
mum was required to apply some type of reasoned analysis to the facts of the case before it.
Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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threatening conduct sway her decision;28' J.M.'s exercise of his right to ap-
peal resulted in the board punishing him far more severely than what Dr.
Welch initially recommended; 282 and that the board's extreme punishment
of J.M. was unprecedented among the school threat cases across the na-
283tion.
The dissenting opinion concluded by acknowledging that while J.M.'s
conduct required some disciplinary action, the board abused its discretion in
expelling him. 284 Upon this finding and the previous conclusion that J.M.'s
letter did not constitute a true threat, the minority said it would affirm the
district court.
285
In a separate dissent, Judge McMillian said that J.M.'s letter was pro-
tected speech and questioned whether the school had any legitimate author-
ity to discipline J.M. regarding the letter since it was not written at school,
during school hours, or with school equipment.286 Judge McMillian noted
that the case arguably was a police matter and that the local prosecuting
attorney had refused to take any action against J.M.
287
V. SIGNIFICANCE
A reader of the Doe decision likely might ask the question: "What
gives the school the authority to punish J.M.?" Seemingly, the only connec-
tion between the letter and the school is that the school happened to be the
place D.M. chose to deliver the stolen letter to K.G. So why did the school
district have the power to punish J.M. for writing the letter?
In light of this lingering question, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit's decision in Doe is significant more for the school
context analysis it excludes than for what it includes.28 8 By excluding the
281. Id. at 635 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that J.M. arrived at the school
board meeting carrying a punishment of a one semester suspension with the right to attend
alternative school. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). He left the meeting, however, with a year-
long expulsion and no opportunity to attend alternative school. id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
283. Doe, 306 F.3d at 635 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The minority contrasted J.M.'s expul-
sion with punishments doled out in several other school threat cases from across the country.
Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). Among the cases cited was one involving a three-day suspension
given to a student who directly threatened to shoot a school counselor if the counselor did not
change the student's class schedule. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th
Cir. 1996).
284. Doe, 306 F.3d at 635-36 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 636 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
288. In oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit, Gregory T. Jones, attorney for the
school district, claimed that the only question before the court was whether J.M.'s letter was
a true threat. Oral Argument, supra note 23. Jones said that because J.M. failed to assert
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school context analysis, Doe supports an overly broad view of a school's
authority over off campus student speech. This view has the effect of erro-
neously suggesting to school officials a seemingly unlimited authority to
discipline student speech arising off campus.
Generally, courts adjudicating off campus student speech cases have
viewed establishing a connection between the speech in question and the
school campus as a threshold issue. 289 Almost without exception, courts
have established some such connection before finding a school to have the
authority to discipline off campus speech. 90 In some cases, courts have
justified a school's jurisdiction to discipline on the grounds that the speech,
though created off campus, has a physical connection to the school campus,
such as on campus distribution of, or the use of school equipment in produc-
ing, an underground newspaper.2 91 In other cases, courts have established
the necessary link by extending the Tinker doctrine to show that speech
arising off campus has led to a substantial and material disruption on cam-
pus.
2 92
But in Doe, a majority of the Eighth Circuit excluded this analysis.
293
The school context analysis was critical to the court's holding, regardless of
whether the court found J.M.'s letter to constitute a true threat. By failing to
articulate the rationale upon which the school's authority was grounded, the
court appears to imply that such authority was never in question-that the
school district's authority to discipline J.M.'s letter was fundamental. This
conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the boundaries supported under
Tinker and its progeny.294 Because the majority failed to establish a nexus
between J.M.'s letter and the school district's authority to punish J.M. for
writing the letter, Doe creates a "dangerously broad precedent" in terms of
procedural or substantive due process claims, the question of whether the school overstepped
its authority was not an issue before the court. Id. In response, Morgan E. Welch, attorney for
J.M., stated that he believed he had brought procedural and substantive due process claims
before the court. Id. The court, neither during oral arguments nor in its opinion, addressed
this procedural dispute. If the majority did in fact rely on Jones's argument in choosing to
exclude the school context analysis, its failure to articulate this reliance results in confusion.
289. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the school board could punish a student for writing an article in an underground newspa-
per on the grounds that the school could forecast substantial disruption of school activities).
For further discussion of this issue, see supra Part II1.B.2.
290. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
291. E.g., Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a school
official's determination that on campus distribution of an underground off campus newspa-
per was a sufficient link to justify the school's authority to discipline the students).
292. E.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (upholding
school's authority to punish an off campus student website on grounds that it created a mate-
rial and substantial disruption at the school).
293. Doe, 306 F.3d at 627 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
294. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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how far school authority may extend over student speech arising off cam-
pus.
295
The practical effect of the court's exclusion of the school context
analysis is that school officials are left with the erroneous impression that
school authority over student speech exists around-the-clock and regardless
of where the speech originates. Under Doe's guidance, principals faced with
similar situations in the future will be more likely to limit student speech
upon any showing that student speech constitutes a threat-regardless of
whether the speech occurred on school grounds or within the privacy of the
student's home. Establishing the grounds for the school's authority would
have given needed clarity as to how far that authority may extend to disci-
pline student speech off campus. Absent this analysis, Doe instead appears
to recognize school districts as having boundless authority to discipline off
campus student speech.
An additional point of significance is Doe's potential to influence fu-
ture cases arising in other contexts. Though the fact scenario in Doe seems
unique, future courts could potentially extend Doe to govern situations such
as those involving student websites created off campus or student disputes
occurring off campus. Already, a number of courts across the country have
faced cases involving off campus websites, including a dispute involving a
high school student in Jonesboro, Arkansas.2 96 Future courts could poten-
tially cite Doe to support a more expansive view of school authority to dis-
cipline student conduct arising in these contexts.
So why did the school district have the authority to punish J.M.? The
Doe court, by excluding the school context analysis, missed an opportunity
to shed light on this important question. Consequently, Doe suggests an
overly broad scope of school authority and leaves school officials still
searching for guidance in determining the limits of school authority over off
campus speech.
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